











This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper I.O-WP-VA86001-
27, Analysis of the Reaction Control System, (19 January 1987).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i00ctobe_ 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : i/1 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: BELLOWS/HOUSING FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE IS LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP, AND POSSIBLE
VENTING OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS INTO POD CREATING FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD. INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP MAY RESULT IN VIOLATION
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTY CONSTRAINTS, CAUSING LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


















3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE TANK ISOL VALVE, ONE FAILURE
(RESTRICTED FLOW IN PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE PROP
TANK, INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTY CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


















3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P620001
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: HOUSING FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS
AND SEAL FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP, AND
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LEAKAGE














HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0418
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, SEAL FAILURE, PRESSURE SURGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EITHER OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANK, OR LOSS OF HELIUM THRU RELIEF VALVE,
INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTY CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF : 2/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE OF SINGLE INLET FILTER RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. INABILITY TO REPRESS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP MAY LEAD TO
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE














QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481
CAUSES: HOUSING FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HE PRESSURANT AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR
DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. MAY ALSO ALLOW LEAKAGE OF PROP OR
PROP VAPORS LEADING TO FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (PREMATURE RUPTURE OR LEAK OF
BURST DISK) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROP TANK PRESSURE,
AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. FAILURES
ALSO RESULT IN LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD
TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (REGS) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES RESULTING IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : I/1 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : 1/1 TAL : i/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROP TANK PRESSURE RESULTS
IN INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROP AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE ALSO ALLOWS
LEAKAGE OF PROP, CREATING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/i RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES AND LOSS AND LEAKAGE OF PROP
RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
VALVES OPEN DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-If
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
FAILS MID-TRAVEL













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IIR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS A FAILED CLOSED VALVE. WITH
FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (FAIL MID-TRAVEL OF CLOSED OF PARALLEL
VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OR ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. FIRST FAILURE
DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF TWO FRCS YAW JETS AND POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE FRCS
DUMP.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVES
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM









i/i RTLS : 3/3
i/I TAL: 3/3
I/i AOA: 3/3
i/1 ATO : i/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING
IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER
INPUT, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
VALVE. WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (FAILS MID-TRAVEL OR
CLOSED OF ANOTHER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FRCS DUMP POST DEORBIT
BURN RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF TWO YAW JETS AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE FRCS DUMP.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTO FF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0420
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING
IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, +Z AXIS
FAILS CLOSED, FAILS OFF














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, +Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, FROZEN PROPELLANT, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (ALL FRCS +Z
JETS) IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. +Z JETS NOT CRITICAL FOR ET
SEP, FRCS DUMPING, OR ENTRY CONTROL.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




9/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT : i/1
I0016 ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILS ON, PREMATURE OPERATION














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILS ON, PREMATURE OPERATION

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0029
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PROP FREEZING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. IMPROPER
MISTURE RATIO OR INADEQUATE COOLING COULD RESULT IN COMBUSTION
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION BURN-THROUGH.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : i/1 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF : i/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, COMBUSTION ANOMALIES, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. MIXING OF MMH
AND N204 IN INJECTOR, OR BURN-THROUGH OF INJECTOR RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION AND DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE ISOL VLV, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTED
FLOW OR FAILED CLOSED PARALLEL VLV) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO REPRESS PROP TANK,
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA : I/1
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0419
CAUSES: HOUSING FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, BELLOWS
AND SEALS FAILURES, HIGH PRESSURE, WELD FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE
TO LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP,
AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES
CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LEAKAGE














HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0418
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, SEAL FAILURE, PRESSURE SURGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EITHER OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF PROP TANK, OR LOSS OF HELIUM THRU RELIEF VALVE,
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND/OR PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM









3/3 RTLS : 1/1
2/1R TAL: 1/1
2 / 2 AOA: i/1
1/1 ATO: 1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE OF SINGLE INLET FILTER RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. INABILITY TO REPRESS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP MAY RESULT IN
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR PROP
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE














QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0481
CAUSES: HOUSING FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HIGH
PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. LOSS OF HE
PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROP TANK PRESSURE, AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP RESULTS IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP
TANK LANDING WEIGHT OCNSTRAINTS. FIRST FAILURE MAY ALSO ALLOW
LEAKAGE OF PROP OR PROP VAPORS LEADING TO FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD
AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 21/R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2 I/R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH FIRST FAILURE, ONE FAILURE (PREMATURE RUPTURE OR LEAK OF
BURST DISK) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF HELIUM PRESSURANT, INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROP TANK PRESSURE,
AND INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP
TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRIANTS. FAILURES ALSO RESULT IN LEAKAGE
OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (REGS) IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROP TANKS AND LINES RESULTING IN
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING : i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0421
CAUSES: HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, HIGH PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURANT AND INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROP TANK PRESSURE RESULTS
IN INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE PROP AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF
ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE ALSO ALLOWS LEAKAGE OF PROP
OR PROP VAPORS, CREATING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO
GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CA, DA
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
RESTRICTED FLOW













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVES 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH RESTRICTED FLOW IN ONE 3/4/5 VALVE, ONE FAILURE (RESTRICTED
FLOW OR FAILED CLOSED PARALLEL VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO IMPROPER FLOW RATE TO THRUSTERS. AN IMPROPER
MISTURE RATIO OR INADEQUATE COOLING AS A RESULT OF RESTRICTED
PROP FLOW COULD RESULT IN COMBUSTION CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION
BURN-THROUGH.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CB, DB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING : i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FALIURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING
IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CB, DB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO RELIEVE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF RELIEF VALVE IN ONE 3/4/5 VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE AND IS
OF NO EFFECT. PARALLEL VALVE DEVICE WILL RELIEVE DOWNSTREAM
PRESSURE. FAILURE OF DEVICES IN BOTH 3/4/5 VALVES IS POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM
LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING IN FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CB, DB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
VALVE. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF THRUSTERS, RESULTING
IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP AND LOSS OF ENTRY CONTROL.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE
DUE TO POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ARCS DUMP.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CB, DB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
FAILS MID-TRAVEL













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
VALVE. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF THRUSTERS, RESULTING
IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP AND LOSS OF ENTRY CONTROL.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CB, DB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RCS CROSSFEED VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM









3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA : 3/IR
3/IR ATO : 3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (ALL OTHER
CROSSFEED VALVES) IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF CROSSFEED LINES,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF PROPELLANT, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CD, DD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RCS CROSSFEED VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
FAILS MID-TRAVEL













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
RCS CROSSFEED VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
VALVE. FIRST FAILURE RESUTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF CROSSFEED/INTERCONNECT CAPABILITY. FIRST FAILURE DURING
RTLS OR TAL IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF RCS
THRUSTERS FOR OMS PROP DUMPING, RESULTING IN AN IMCOMPLETE OMS
DUMP.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099, 43CD, DD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
FAILURE MODE: RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED












PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING
IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : i/1 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0420
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM LINES, AND LOSS/LEAKAGE OF PROP RESULTING
IN FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND CREW. VALVES OPEN
DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC284-0430
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR A FAILED CLOSED
VALVE. FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF THRUSTERS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEP AND ENTRY CONTROL. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL
IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ONE MANIFOLD AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE ADEQUATE OMS AND/OR RCS DUMPS.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : i/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT : I/1 AOA : I/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING : I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0428
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 10039 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIER, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : i/1 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF : 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING : 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0029
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
RESTRICTED FLOW














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PROP FREEZING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. IMPROPER
MIXTURE RATIO OR INADEQUATE COOLING COULD RESULT IN COMBUSTION
CHAMBER OR NOZZLE EXTENSION BURN-THROUGH.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, COMBUSTION ANOMALIES, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. MIXING OF MMH
AND N204 IN INJECTOR, OR BURN-THROUGH OF INJECTOR RESULTS IN
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION AND DAMAGE TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
DELAYED OPERATION, ONE VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. DELAYED OPENING
OF THE OXIDIZER VALVE COULD RESULT IN MIGRATION OF FUEL INTO THE
OXIDIZER INJECTOR TUBE AND DETONATION WITHIN TUBE UPON OXIDIZER
FLOW. RUPTURE OF VALVE ASSEMBLY DUE TO JET ZOTS REQUIRED
IN LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174 2) VS70-942099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
DELAYED OPERATION, ONE VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MATERIAL/MANUFACTURING DEFECT, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE IS POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. DELAYED OPENING
OF THE OXIDIZER VALVE COULD RESULT IN MIGRATION OF FUEL INTO THE
OXIDIZER INJECTOR TUBE AND DETONATION WITHIN TUBE UPON OXIDIZER
FLOW. RUPTURE OF VALVE ASSEMBLY DUE TO JET ZOTS REQUIRED
IN LEAKAGE OF PROP, FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, AND HAZARD TO GROUND
CREW.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 10116 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, PREMATURE OPERATION














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: i) JSC 11174, 11.6 2) VS70-942099, 42BN, BT
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS ON











THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : I/1 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC467-0428
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
PREMATURE/CONTINUOUS/IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE DURING FLIGHT COULD RESULT IN CONTACT WITH PAYLOAD
DURING RENDEZVOUS, CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE OR EVA CREW. FIRST
FAILURE DURING GROUND PHASES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND CREW
DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP VAPORS AND EXHAUST PLUME.
REFERENCES: I) JSC 11174, 11.5 2) VS70-943099
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE GROUND DRIVER MANUALLY. GROUND
DRIVER CAN STILL BE INHIBITED BY MDM FF2. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE, WHICH COULD
PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN OR CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE
WITH SWITCH 34. GPC CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE IS STILL OPERABLE.
GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN VALVE IS NOT OPERABLE. THE ISOLATION
VALVE THEREFORE CANNOT BE CLOSED, WHICH COULD PREVENT ISOLATION
OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-48
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE WITH THE SWITCH. GPC
PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. INABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH LOSS OF
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS CLOSED (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE IF SWITCH FAILED ACROSS
CLOSE CONTACTS. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE CAUSES LOSS OF
VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS (2/2). SWITCH FAILED SHORT
ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER
LEAK (3/IR).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS














REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8 $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE IF SWITCH FAILED ACROSS
CLOSE CONTACTS. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE CAUSES LOSS OF
VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS (2/2) . SWITCH FAILED SHORT
ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
LEAK.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/SHORTS (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY,
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE WITH THE SWITCH. GPC PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.
INABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J2-i04, J2-83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE STATUS.
MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR (MDM FF3) PROVIDES LATEST MICROSWITCH
DISCRETE INFORMATION OF THE VALVES. VRCS MAY NOT BE USED IF
VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION). LOSE INHIBITS
TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" AND "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J2-i04, J2-83





REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J14-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR RPC 28 STATUS WITH MDM
OF3. DATA NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J14-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR RPC 29 STATUS WITH MDM
OF3. DATA NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 Ji-88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FUEL CLOSED DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FF3). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA STATE AND
SET THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED
TO OVERRIDE THE VALVE STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK INDICATOR
PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 Ji-91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OXIDIZER OPEN DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FF3). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA STATE AND
SET THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED
TO OVERRIDE THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 JI-90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FUEL OPEN DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR (MDM
FF3). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA STATE AND SET
THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED TO
OVERRIDE THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 Ji-89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OXIDIZER CLOSE DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FF3). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA STATE AND
SET THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED
TO OVERRIDE THE MANIFOLD STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
EVENT INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE
STATUS. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FF3). LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS
(MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
EVENT INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITOR THE ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR
CLOSE STATUS. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH THE MANIFOLD STATUS
MONITOR (MDM FF3). LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE. FAILURE DETECTABLE WITH MDM OF 3.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 RPC28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBITS TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER.
DETECTABLE WITH MDM OF3.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 RPC29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
DETECTABLE WITH MDM OF1.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 RPC29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VISUAL "CLOSE" INDICATION OF VALVE CLOSURE. ALSO LOSE AN
INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER. THE MANIFOLD STATUS
MONITOR (MDM FF3) PROVIDES VALVE POSITION DATA. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO
BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-53 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE OPEN, TALKBACK WILL DISPLAY BARBERPOLE. VALVE
STATUS CAN BE MONITORED BY MDM FF3. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER SO THAT
IT CANNOT BE TURNED ON. THIS PREVENTS CLOSURE OF THE VALVE
MANUALLY OR WITH THE GPC AND WILL NOT ALLOW ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-55 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VISUAL "OPEN" INDICATION OF VALVE. ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO
THE TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER. THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR (MDM
FF3) PROVIDES VALVE POSITION DATA. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AISR J4-55 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, TALKBACK WILL DISPLAY BARBERPOLE. VALVE
STATUS CAN BE MONITORED BY MDM FF3. ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO THE
TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER SO THAT IT CANNOT BE TURNED ON, THUS NOT
ALLOWING THE VALVE TO BE OPENED (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R J5-K, L TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J5-K, L TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBITS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. THE GROUND
DRIVER MUST BE TURNED ON FOR VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS
ATTEMPTED TO BE OPENED, BOTH SOLENOIDS WILL CONDUCT (WITH PROPER
GROUND DRIVER STIMULI). WITH BOTH SOLENOID ENERGIZED
THE VALVE WILL TRANSFER TO OR REMAIN OPEN. VALVE CAN BE CLOSED
WITH PROPER GROUND DRIVER STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-71 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY OR WITH GPC.
ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO
CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, HAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76A18R J4-71 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ALSO LOSE INHIBIT TO
TURN ON RPC 28. INABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS
OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-51 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J4-51 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBIT TO TURN ON RPC 29.
REQUIRED TO OPEN VALVE.
OTHER INHIBITS
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J5-Y TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN THIS
VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R J5-Y TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE (WITH BOTH SOLENOIDS
ENERGIZED, VALVE WILL TRANSFER OR STAY OPEN). INABILITY TO CLOSE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R J5-G TYPE IV
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH VALVE CLOSED, LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE.
INABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS
OF MISSION). WITH VALVE OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION
VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE (3/IR, PNP).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA
83V76AISR J5-G TYPE IV
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS INHIBIT FROM SWITCH 34 AND GPC INHIBITS FROM MDM FF2 TO TURN
THE DRIVER ON. MANUAL AND GPC VALVE MOVEMENT STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J2-87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. ALSO LOSE
AN INHIBIT TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. GPC COMMANDS FOR
OPEN/CLOSE STILL OEPRABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8 J2-87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FFI STIMULI.
CLOSE INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER.
LOSE MANUAL
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8 Ji-93
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. MANUAL COMMAND
FOR OPEN/CLOSE STILL OPERABLE FROM SWITCH 34. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
83V76AI8 Ji-93
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J13-6
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FF3 STIMULI. LOSE
EXCLUSIVE GPC OPEN INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER FROM MDM
FFI (MDM FF3 ALLOWED TO INHIBIT THE TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J13-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL
OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-94
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A





























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J13-95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FFI STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS FROM SWITCH 34 STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-96
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J13-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM




















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR OPEN VALVE STATUS VISUALLY. MANIFOLD
STATUS MONITOR (MDM FF3) PROVIDES REDUNDANCY FOR VALVE STATUS.
LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF
VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR CLOSE VALVE STATUS VISUALLY. MANIFOLD
STATUS MONITOR (MDM FF3) PROVIDES REDUNDANCY FOR VALVE STATUS.
LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF
VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC
OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-102
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FF3 STIMULI. LOSE MANUAL
CLOSE INHIBIT TO THE TYPE I (J4-71) DRIVER WITH MDM FF3 STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-103
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J13-3
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL
OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS FROM SWITCH 34 STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-104
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J13-3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J7-R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY INHIBIT THE DRIVER TO GROUND, THUS
PREVENTING THE VALVE TO OPEN OR CLOSE. GPC CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT
GROUND DRIVER STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-106
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FF2 STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-107
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-S
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE THE GPC CLOSE INHIBIT TO THE GROUND DRIVER, WHICH PREVENTS
THE VALVE TO CLOSE. MANUAL INHIBIT AND GPC OPEN INHIBIT STILL
OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-108
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-S
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH 34 AND MDM FF2 "OPEN"
STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-T
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE GPC OPEN INHIBIT TO THE GROUND DRIVER, WHICH PREVENTS
THE VALVE TO BE OPENED. MANUAL INHIBIT AND GPC CLOSE INHIBIT
STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVES
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-T
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH 34 AND MDM FF2 "CLOSE"
STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-Ill
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24 J7-e
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVES EITHER MANUALLY OR WITH
GPC. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-If2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
83V76A24 J7-e
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FOR THE MDM OF1 AND RPC 29
STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-II3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MANIFOLD 5, OX ISOL VLV
PART NUMBER: 22V42LV258 Jl-i (BOTH DIODES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE DIODE HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SECOND DIODE (THE
REDUNDANCY) PREVENTS FURTHER OXIDIZER VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE
IS OPEN, INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER
LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY,
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-f14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MANIFOLD 5, OX ISOL VLV
22V42LV258 Jl-i (BOTH DIODES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM ERRONEOUS STIMULI TO THE
OXIDIZER SOLENOIDS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-f15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MANIFOLD 5, FU ISOLVLV
PART NUMBER: 22V42LV257 Jl-I (BOTH DIODES)
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE DIODE HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SECOND DIODE (THE
REDUNDANT) PREVENTS FURTHER FUEL VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS
OPEN, INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER
LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY,
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-II6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MANIFOLD 5, FU ISOL VLV
22V42LV257 Jl-i (BOTH DIODES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM ERRONEOUS STIMULI TO THE FUEL
SOLENOIDS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-II7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT GROUND DRIVER MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDS
STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FURTHER VALVE
MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS CLOSED, VRCS IS NOT OPERABLE (LOSS OF
MISSION). IF VALVE IS OPEN, INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF THRUST LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-II8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN CIRCUIT BREAKER.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-II9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
22V42LVI58 Ji-3, 9; 22V42LVI57 JI-3, 9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE STATUS.
MANIFOLD STATUS (MDM FF3) PROVIDES LATEST MICROSWITCH DISCRETE
INFORMATION OF VALVE LOCATION. VRCS MAY BE LOST IF VALVES ARE
THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION). ALSO LOSE INHIBITS
TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" AND "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MI CROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV
PART NUMBER: 22V42LVI58 Ji-3, 9; 22V42LVI57 JI-3, 9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR OPEN OR CLOSE STATUS. VRCS MAY BE
LOST IF VALVES ARE THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION). ALSO
LOSE INHIBITS TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" OR "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-121
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH 16 OR 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73ASSI6; S17
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
VALVE AVAILABLE WITH GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THE
HELIUM SYSTEM LEADING TO POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
RUPTURE OF PROPELLANT TANKS AND LINES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6 WILL
PREVENT FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
WHICH LEADS TO C.G. SAFETY BOUNDARY EXCEEDANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS WILL PREVENT
ANY FURTHER MOVEMENT OF THAT VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
WHICH LEADS TO C.G. SAFETY BOUNDARY EXCEEDANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)










3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH 16 OR 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 08
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8SI6; S17
BC ] cc ]





REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)




3) lie PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE AND WILL PREVENT FURTHER
SWITCH MOVEMENT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH THE GPC COMMANDS.
LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS IN EFFORTS TO MEET
C.G. CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING/OPENING THE ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE
TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK. FAILURE TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY WHICH
LEADS TO INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING/OPENING THE ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE
TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK. FAILURE TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY WHICH
LEADS TO INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHILE IN THE GPC POSITION, A SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS i, 2 WILL
OPEN THE VALVE. THIS FAILURE, WITH THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
COULD PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAKWHICH LEADS TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A LEAK, INADVERTENTLY
OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS LEAK WHICH LEADS TO
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-130
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE. LOSE CAPABILITY TO
MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH. REDUNDANCY IS
PROVIDE BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS
CLOSING/OPENING THE ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE TO CLOSE THE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. FAILURE
TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY WHICH LEADS TO INABILITY
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL • 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $24
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S24
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING (OPENING) THE ISOLATION VALVE.
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK. FAILURE TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY
WHICH LEAD TO INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G.
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS OPENING (CLOSING) THE ISOLATION VALVE.
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK. FAILURE TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY
WHICH LEADS TO INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHILE IN THE GPC POSITION, A SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS i, 2 WILL
OPEN THE VALVE. THIS FAILURE, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, COULD PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH
LEADS TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A LEAK, INADVERTENTLY
OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS LEAK WHICH LEADS TO
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS : 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVES WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE MDM COMMANDS. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING (OPENING) THE ISOLATION VALVE.
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK. FAILURE TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FORWARD RCS ACTIVITY
WHICH LEADS TO INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. SAFETY
MARGINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30

















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $30
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S30
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDS
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH WARRANT LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH INADVERTENTLY CLOSES, THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD WILL BE
LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-140
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLVS












3/IR ATO : 3/IR
3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE IA FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDS
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANT TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH WARRANT LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
BOUNDARIES TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $31
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S31
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. INABIBLITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE

















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE INADVERTENTLY CLOSES, THE JETS ON THAT MANIFOLD WILL BE
LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
SWITCH FAIL OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE GPC COMMANDS
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH WARRANT LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAIL SHORT (WORST CASE)
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF : 3/ IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH INADVERTENTLY CLOSES JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD WILL BE
LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD I. LOSS OF THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT CONTROL
OF ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDS
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH WARRANT LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
SWTICH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $33
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S33
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHEETS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE INADVERTENTLY CLOSES LOSE JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)








































B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT RPC 38. RPC 38 OUTPUT REQUIRED TO
TURN ON DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER, AND ELECTRONIC POWER.
THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
MANIFOLD 3 JETS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY AFFECT DE-ORBIT FRCS DUMP TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV DEO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
REQUIRED TO FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
REQUIRED TO FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS (WORST CASE)


















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO FIRE. DURING FLIGHT, SWITCH IS EASILY
CORRECTABLE. DURING ASCENT, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY. DURING RTLS/TAL, IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED
OFF, IT MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW. THIS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3
JETS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY AFFECT DE-ORBIT FRCS DUMP AND CAUSE LOSS OF JETS FOR ET
SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT RELAY KII AND HYBRID DRIVER, BOTH OF
WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE JET DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS AND A REDUNDANCY PATH FOR MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 1 JETS CAN STILL BE PROVIDED BY
REMAINING REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL PATH FOR MANIFOLD 3 JETS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-162
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FAILURES TO FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
REQUIRES OTHER
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 014 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY FAILS OPEN/CLOSED (WORST















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, JETS ON MANIFOLD i WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO FIRE. DURING FLIGHT, SWITCH IS EASILY
CORRECTABLE. DURING ASCENT, JETS ARE USED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER MANIFOLDS. DURING RTLS/TAL, IT MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE, THE 2 AMP (OR 1 AMP) FUSE WILL BLOW. EITHER WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD 3. JETS ARE REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. BOUNDARIES. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER AND
ELECTRONIC POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 2 JETS. MANIFOLD
4 JETS PROVIDES -Y AND -Z THRUST REDUNDANCY AND MANIFOLD 1 OR 3
JETS PROVIDE + AND -X THRUST REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET C.G. CONTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF JETS FOR ET SEPARATION.
FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE CAUSES NO EFFECT.
REQUIRED TO FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 015 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S7
] B C ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THURSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQURIED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, JETS ON MANIFOLD 2 WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO FIRE. DURING FLIGHT, SWITCH IS EASILY
CORRECTABLE. DURING ASCENT, JETS ARE REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
MANIFOLD 4 JETS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. DURING RTLS/TAL IT MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE II.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-170
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THIS WILL BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE. THIS
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 2 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON MANIFOLDS I, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS
DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS
AND CAUSE LOSS OF JETS FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING
RTLS/TALMAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)


















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF
MANIFOLD 2 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 , 3,
AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSE
LOSS OF JETS FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQURIED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE iioi0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
SWITCH POSITION IS EASILY CORRECTABLE. DURING FLIGHT JETS ARE
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 4.
DURING RTLS/TAL, IT MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE
TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
















RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 015 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S8
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW. THIS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF MANIFOLD 2 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
i, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSE LOSS OF
JETS FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-176
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER, AND
ELECTRONIC POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 1 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS FRCS DUMP TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS
AND CAUSES LOSS OF -Z JETS FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)












RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S5
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-178
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THURSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)












RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO FIRE. DURING ASCENT, JETS ARE REQUIRED FOR ET
SEPARATION. DURING FLIGHT, SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE. DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-180
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW. THIS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD i, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP
TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF
-Z JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. DURING RTLS/TAL, MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER, AND
ELECTRONIC POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 1 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS FRCS DUMP TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS
AND CAUSES LOSS OF -Z JETS FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-182
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURE REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF, JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO FIRE. DURING ASCENT, JETS ARE REQUIRED FOR ET
SEPARATION. DURING FLIGHT, SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE. DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE














MANIFOLD 3 , RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW. THIS WILL
CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 1
JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FRCS DUMP TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF -Z JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. DURING RTLS/TAL, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-186
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER, AND
ELECTRONIC POWER FOR BOTH MANIFOLDS 4 AND 5 JETS. MANIFOLD 4 JET
REDUNDANCY FOR -Y AND -Z THRUST PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 2 JETS.
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR MANIFOLD 5 JETS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANT -Y AND -Z THRUST PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF
JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. LOSS OF MANIFOLD 5 JETS
(VERNIERS) MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)


















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 S12
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI2
] B C ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-188
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH IS INADVERTENTLY TURNED OFF, LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4
AND 5. MANIFOLD 4 JETS USED DURING ASCENT (REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
FOR ET SEPARATION BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2). SWITCH IS EASILY
CORRECTABLE ON-ORBIT (NO EFFECT). DURING RTLS/TAL, MAY
CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON
DRIVER POWER, BITE DRIVER POWER, AND ELECTRONIC POWER FOR BOTH
MANIFOLDS 4 AND 5 JETS. MANIFOLD 4 JET REDUNDANCY FOR -Y AND -Z
THRUST PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 2 JETS. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
FOR MANIFOLD 5 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT -Y AND -Z THRUST
PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET
SEPARATION. LOSS OF MANIFOLD 5 JETS (VERNIERS) MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii. I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)


















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 016 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS AND
LOSE REDUNDANCY PATH FOR DRIVER POWER TO MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
MANIFOLD 4 JET REDUNDANCY FOR -Y AND -Z THRUST PROVIDED BY
MANIFOLD 2 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY -Y AND -Z THRUST
PREVENTS FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET
SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS
TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-192
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)


































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG i
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT CAUSES NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-194
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH INADVERTENTLY TURNS OFF, LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND A
REDUNDANCY PATH FOR DRIVER POWER TO MANIFOLD 3 JETS. MANIFOLD 4
JETS USED DURING ASCENT (REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR ET SEPARATION BY
JETS ON MANIFOLD 2). SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE ON-ORBIT (NO
EFFECT). FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 016 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE IT WILL BLOW THE 2 AMP FUSE. LOSE
CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS AND LOSE
REDUNDANCY PATH FOR DRIVER POWER TO MANIFOLD 3 JETS. MANIFOLD 4
JET REDUNDANCY FOR -Y AND -Z THRUST PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 2 JETS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT -Y AND -Z THRUST PREVENTS FRCS DUMP
REQUIRED TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS AND
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-196
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)












RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE L5/F5/R5,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS, AND MAY AFFECT ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-197
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)












RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT HAS NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE II.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-198
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT HAS NO EFFECT.
FIRE A THRUSTER INADVERTENTLY.
OTHER FAILURES REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-199
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 S15
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI5
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. SWITCH IS EASILY CORRECTABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-200
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW. FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE L5/F5/R5, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS, AND MAY AFFECT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD l, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF JETS ON THE MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY HAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-204
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 7.5 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-
ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-206
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15



















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 2 WILL FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-208
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 11167 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)




3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, JETS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 2 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 4 JETS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)














MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-210
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 7.5 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 2 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON MANIFOL D 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-
ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














MANIFOLD 3 , JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD I. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-212
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 1 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S16
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI6
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 7.5 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON MANIFOLD i. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-
ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)









3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIOANL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 4 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 2 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-219
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 11179 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 5 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 4 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-
ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR FORWARD VERNIERS, THUS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-222
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
SWITCH FAILS SHORT CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. NO
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR FORWARD VERNIERS, THUS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-224
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S18
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 5 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. NO REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED FOR FORWARD VERNIERS, THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-226
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL PROPELLANTS MAY FREEZE DUE TO INABILITY TO TURN
ON PANEL HEATERS. MANEUVERING CAPABILITIES THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES MAY BE LIMITED IN ORDER FOR ORBITER TO WARM TANKS BY
FACING THE SUN. NOTE: SWITCH DRAWN INCORRECTLY ON SHEMATIC
VS-942099. REFER TO SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-227
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS














3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 $3
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4S3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQURIES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS. NOTE: SWITCH DRAWIN INCORRECTLY ON
SHEMATIC VS70-942099. REFER TO SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-228
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)














HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL PROPELLANTS MAY FREEZE DUE TO INABILITY TO TURN
ON PANEL HEATERS. MANEUVERING CAPABILITIES THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES MAY BE LIMITED. NOTE: SWITCH DRAWN INCORRECTLY ON
SHEMATIC VS70-942099. REFER TO SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)














HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NOTE: SWITCH DRAWN INCORRECTLY ON SCHEMATIC VS70-
942099. REFER TO SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-230
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)














HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, ASSOCIATED 1 AMP FUSE WITH BLOW.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITHIN THE SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE OXIDIZER AND FUEL PROPELLANTS TO FREEZE DUE TO
INABILITY TO TURN ON PANEL HEATERS. MANEUVERING CAPABILITIES
THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES MAY BE LIMITED. NOTE: SWITCH DRAWN
INCORRECTLY ON SHEMATIC VS70-942099. REFER TO SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK. ALSO SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOD SHOWS 3
AMP FUSES BUT SCHEMATIC VS70-942099 SHOWS 1 AMP FUSES.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 11190 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH; (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METIER MI2. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAVE NO EFFECT SINCE
GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-232
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH; (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OF POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE GAGES M9, MI0, AND MI1 FOR MONITORING.
REDUNDANT MEASUREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH GPC AND ARE PART OF
THE C&W SYSTEM. THE LOSS OF ALL SIGNAL PATHS FOR OMS RT/LT/KIT
PROP ULLAGE, RCS RT/LT/FWD PROP ULLAGE AND RCS RT/LT/FWD
HE TK PRESSURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION FOR SAFETY REASONS
SINCE THE ACTUAL STATUS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE UNAVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METER MI2. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAS NO EFFECT SINCE
GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE MII PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF RT OMS/RCS PROPELLANT
ULLAGE AND RT RCS HE TANK PRESSURES. REDUNDANT GPC MEASUREMENT
PATHS ARE AVAILABLE (RT OMS FU/OX V43P5321C/V43P5221C, RT RCS
FU/OX V42P3116C/V42P3115C, RT RCS HE TANK OX/FU V42P3110C,
V42P3112C/V42P3113C, V42P3114C). ERRONEOUS INDICATION FROM LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PL & OO PHASES WOULD RESULT IN RT RCS HE TK
BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN A LOSS OF DELTA V AND LOSS OF
MISSION CAPABILITY (REF. FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR
FAILURE IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAGE M9 PROVIDES A FALSE INDICATION OF LT OMS/RCS PROPELLANT
ULLAGE AND LT RCS HE TANK PRESSURES. REDUNDANT GPC MEASUREMENT
PATHS ARE AVAILABLE (LT OMS FU/OX V43P4321C/V43P4221C, LT RCS
FU/OX V42P2116C/V42P2115C, LT RCS HE TANK OX/FU V42P2110C,
V42P2112C/V42P2113C, V42P2114C). ERRONEOUS INDICATION FROM LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN PL & OO PHASES WOULD RESULT IN LT RCS HE TK
BEING DECLARED FAILED RESULTING IN A LOSS OF DELTA V AND LOSS OF
MISSION CAPABILITY (REF. FLIGHT RULE 6-41), UNLESS SENSOR
FAILURE IS DETERMINED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-236
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL CONDITIONER
OF2. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT RCS JETS. THEREFORE
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT -Z JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JET
ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAY CAUSE LOSS
OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FORWARD BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: 83V75AI8
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER CONTAINS HELIUM OXIDIZER TANK PRESSURE DATA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO UNCERTAINTY ABOUT QUANTITY OF
PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-238
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL CONDITIONER
OF2. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT RCS JETS. THEREFORE,
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT -Z JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JET
ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS OFF




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDF #i & RJDF #2
PART NUMBER: 81V79A8 & 82V79A9
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JET ASSOCIATED WITH +Y, -Y, OR -Z THRUST COMPONENT IS THE
WORST CASE. REDUNDANCY FOR JET PROVIDED BY JET ON DIFFERENT
MANIFOLD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND FRCS DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS ON

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDF #i & RJDF #2
PART NUMBER: 81V79A8 & 82V79A9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JET DRIVER FAILED ON WILL PROVIDE LATCHING ENERGY TO BI-
PROPELLANT VALVES ALLOWING FIRING. CREW MUST ISOLATE PROPELLANT
BY CLOSING ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. INADVERTENT FIRING DURING ANY
MISSION PHASE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS OFF

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
WITHIN RJDF #I & RJDF #2
81V79A8 & 82V79A9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE JET ASSOCIATED WITH +Y, OR -Y VERNIER THRUST COMPONENT. NO
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO LOSS OF VERNIERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS ON




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDF #i & RJDF #2
PART NUMBER: 81V79A8 & 82V79A9
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JET DRIVER FAILED ON WILL PROVIDE LATCHING ENERGY TO BI-
PROPELLANT VALVES ALLOWING FIRING. CREW MUST ISOLATE PROPELLANT
BY CLOSING MANIFOLD 5 VALVES. INADVERTENT FIRING DURING ANY
MISSION PHASE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV C EO D01; JSC-20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




Jl-I (FOUR DIODES), Jl-i (FOUR DIODES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED OPEN DIODE ASSOCIATED WITH "OPEN" SOLENOID PREVENTS VALVE
FROM BEING OPENED. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF
THIS MAY PREVENT FRCS DUMP REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
C.G. BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




Jl-i (FOUR DIODES), Jl-i (FOUR DIODES)




REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2{26/88 E-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-246
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA : 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/IR ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILED ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW VALVE TO
BE CLOSED. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
















PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5
MI CROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 22V42LVI63, 22V42LVI64
PART NUMBER: JI-F (BOTH MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILED ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW VALVE TO
BE CLOSED. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS EITHER CONTACTS WILL PROVIDE AN
INACCURATE TALKBACK. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-249
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS EITHER CONTACTS WILL PROVIDE AN
INACCURATE TALKBACK DISPLAY. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-250
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 22V42LVI37, 22V42LVI38
PART NUMBER: J1-F (BOTH MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS EITHER CONTACTS WILL PROVIDE AN
INACCURATE TALKBACK DISPLAY. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 22V42LVI47, 22V42LVI48
PART NUMBER: JI-F (BOTH MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS EITHER CONTACTS WILL PROVIDE AN
INACCURATE TALKBACK DISPLAY. THIS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-252
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA I; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CR37; 82V76A23CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
WITH THE GPC. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANT TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














HE OX & FU ISOL A & B VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA i; F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A22CRI3; 82V76A23CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH MANUAL SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS
OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-254
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND




3 ) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CR35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 1 DRIVER POWER THUS LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD I.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
81V76A23CR40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 2 DRIVER POWER THUS LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD i. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD i. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANIFOLD 4 DRIVER POWER THUS LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD 4.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO MEET C.G. CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VERNIER DRIVER POWER WHICH CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIER JETS THUS
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














MANIFOLD 3 , RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
83V76A22AICR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD I. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
83V76A22AICR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLD i. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET C.G.
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CRJ7-e
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV D EO BI2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-263
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 F26; F32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE GROUND DRIVER MANUALLY. GROUND
DRIVER CAN STILL BE INHIBITED BY MDM FA4. LOSS OF THIS COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-264
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 F25; F31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN OR CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE
WITH THE SWITCH. GPC VALVE CONTROL IS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; PNL 07 $31
33V73A7 $26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 $26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
4) MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 $26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-268
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/SHORTS (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S26; $31
33V73A7 $26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THURSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN 102-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-269
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 $26; $31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. LOSE CAPABILITY TO
CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J8-66, 67; J4-22, 21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN AND CLOSE STATUS.
MANIFOLD STATUS (MDM FAI; MDM FA2) PROVIDES LATEST MICROSWITCH
DISCRETE INFORMATION OF THE VALVES. VRCS MAY NOT BE USED IF
VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION). ALSO LOSE
INHIBITS TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" AND "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J8-66, 67; J4-22, 21





REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-272
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33R J7-6; J7-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR RPC 15; RPC i0 WITH MDM
OA3. DATA NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33R J7-3; J7-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR RPC 14; RPC 12 WITH MDM
OAI. DATA NOT MISSION CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-274
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-45, J2-20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FUEL CLOSED DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FAI, FA2). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA
STATE AND SET THE MANIFOL STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE
REQUIRED TO OVERRIDE THE VALVE STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-40, J2-22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OXIDIZER OPEN DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FAI, FA2). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR HAY ISSUE A DILEMMA
STATE AND SET THE MANIFOL STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE
REQUIRED TO OVERRIDE THE VALVE STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-41, J2-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FUEL OPEN DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR (MDM
FAI, FA2). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA STATE AND
SET THE MANIFOL STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE REQUIRED
TO OVERRIDE THE VALVE STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-277
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R J2-46, J2-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OXIDIZER CLOSE DISCRETE INPUT TO THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FAI, FA2). MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR MAY ISSUE A DILEMMA
STATE AND SET THE MANIFOL STATUS TO CLOSED. KEYBOARD ENTRIES ARE
REQUIRED TO OVERRIDE THE VALVE STATUS TO OPEN. TALKBACK
INDICATOR PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
EVENT INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 DSI7; DS22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE
STATUS. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FAI, FA3). LOSE OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS
(MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
EVENT INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 DSI7; DS22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO VISUALLY MONITOR THE ISOLATION OPEN OR CLOSE
STATUS. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH THE MANIFOLD STATUS MONITOR
(MDM FAI, FA3). LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS
(MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 RPCI5, i0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO CLOSE
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 RPCI5, i0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" HYBRID DRIVER.
DETECTABLE WITH MDM OA3.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-282
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76A133 RPC14, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENT VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
DETECTABLE WITH MDM OAf.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 RPCI4, 12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" HYBRID DRIVER.
DETECTABLE WITH MDM OAI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-284
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 176, 159 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VISUAL INDICATION OF VALVE CLOSURE STATUS. ALSO LOSE
INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVER. THE MANIFOLD
STATUS MONITOR (MDM FAI, FA2) PROVIDES VALVE POSITION DATA. LOSS
OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES
THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED. TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER REQUIRES OTHER
INHIBITS TO DRIVE IT AND THE GROUND DRIVE MUST BE DRIVEN FOR
UNEXPECTED VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE MOVEMENT.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 176, 159 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE OPEN, TALKBACK WILL DISPLAY BARBERPOLE. VALVE
STATUS CAN BE MONITORED WITH MDM FAI, FA2. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OR VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES THOUGHT TO
BE CLOSED. ALSO LOSE INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER SO
THAT IT CANNOT BE TURNED ON. THIS PREVENTS CLOSURE OF THE VALVE
MANUALLY OR WITH THE GPC, THUS PREVENTING ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY,
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-286
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 177, 160 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE VISUAL INDICATION OF VALVE OPEN STATUS. ALSO LOSE AN
INHIBIT TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER. THE MANIFOLD STATUS
MONITOR (MDM FAI, FA2) PROVIDES VALVE POSITION DATA. LOSS OF
THIS REDUNDANCY HAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES
THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED. TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER REQUIRES OTHER
INHIBITS TO DRIVE IT AND THE GROUND DRIVER MUST BE DRIVEN FOR
UNEXPECTED VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE MOVEMENT.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] sc ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 177, 160 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, TALKBACK WILL DISPLAY BARBERPOLE. VALVE
STATUS CAN BE MONITORED BY MDM FAI, FA2. ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO
THE TYPE III "OPEN" DRIVER SO THAT IT CANNOT BE TURNED ON, THUS
NOT ALLOWING THE VALVE TO BE OPENED (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-288
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R 178, 161 TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE WHICH PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R 178, 161 TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBITS REQUIRED TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. THE GROUND
DRIVER MUST BE TURNED ON FOR VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS
ATTEMPTED TO BE OPENED, BOTH SOLENOIDS WILL CONDUCT (WITH PROPER
GROUND DRIVER STIMULI). WITH BOTH SOLENOIDS ENERGIZED,
THE VALVE WILL TRANSFER TO OR REMAIN OPEN. BY REMOVING "OPEN"
COMMAND, VALVE WILL CLOSE WITH PROPER GROUND STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-290
k_ C
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 180, 163 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT
TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY, TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R 180, 163 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ALSO LOSE AN INHIBIT TO
TURN ON RPC 15, i0. INABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS
VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 179, 162 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-293
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23R 179, 162 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBIT TO TURN ON RPC 14, 12.
REQUIRED TO OPEN VALVE.
OTHER INHIBITS
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76A133R J8-Z, J8-M TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN THIS
VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33R J8-Z, J8-M TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE (WITH BOTH SOLENOIDS
ENERGIZED, VALVE WILL TRANSFER OR REMAIN OPEN). INABILITY TO
CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-296
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33R J2-L, J2-a TYPE IV
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION (LOSS OF MISSION).
VALVE WAS OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE.
INABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
IF
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33R J2-L, J2-a TYPE IV
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE INHIBIT FROM THE SWITCH AND GPC INHIBITS FROM
MDM FA4 TO TURN THE DRIVER ON. MANUAL AND GPC COMMANDS FOR VALVE
MOVEMENT STILL OPERATE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-298
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J4-50, J4-47





REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J4-50, J4-47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-54, J6-23





REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-54, J6-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23 J2-38, J2-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. ALSO LOSE
INHIBIT TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. GPC COMMANDS FOR OPEN OR
CLOSE OF VALVE STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23 J2-38, J2-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FA2, FAI STIMULI.
MANUAL CLOSE INHIBIT TO TYPE III "CLOSE" DRIVER.
LOSE
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-304
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23 J2-44, J2-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE. MANUAL COMMAND
FOR OPEN/CLOSE STILL OPERABLE FROM SWITCH. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO
CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED
WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23 J2-44, J2-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-306
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J2-D, J2-T
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL
OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-D, J2-T
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-308
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J5-j, J5-V
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC OPEN/CLOSE
COMMAND TO MOVE VALVE STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-309
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J5-j, J5-V
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FAI, FA2.
GPC OPEN INHIBIT FROM MDM FA3.
LOSE EXCLUSIVE
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-310
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J5-j, J5-V
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY.
OPEN/CLOSED COMMANDS TO MOVE VALVE STILL OPERABLE.




REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J5-j, J5-V
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FA3 STIMULI.
EXCLUSIVE GPC OPEN INHIBIT FROM MDM FAI, FA2.
LOSE
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-312
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-F,J2-V
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE
COMMANDS FROM SWITCH STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-313
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-F, J2-V
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-314
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J7-3, J7-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVES EITHER MANUALLY OR WITH
GPC (LOSS OF MISSION).
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-315
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J7-3, J7-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FOR MDM OAI AND FROM RPC 14, 12.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-316
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-42, J6-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR OPEN VALVE STATUS VISUALLY. MANIFOLD
STATUS MONITOR (MDM FAI, FA2) ALSO PROVIDES VALVE STATUS. LOSS
OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES
THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-317
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-42, J6-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FOR DRIVER OUTPUT.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-318
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-33, J6-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR CLOSE VALVE STATUS VISUALLY. MANIFOLD
STATUS MONITOR (MDM FAI, FA2) ALSO PROVIDES VALVE STATUS. LOSS
OF THIS REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VRCS (MISSION) IF VALVES
THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26; $31
33V73A7 J6-33, J6-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FOR DRIVER OUTPUT.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J2-6, J2-W
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE MANUALLY. GPC
OPEN/CLOSED COMMANDS STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-6, J2-W
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-322
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-H, J7-X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE WITH GPC. MANUAL
OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS FROM SWITCH STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J2-H, J7-X
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-A, J2-P
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY INHIBIT THE DRIVER TO GROUND. GPC
CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT GROUND DRIVER STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF
THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-A, J2-P
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM MDM FA4 STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-326
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-B, J2-R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE THE GPC CLOSE INHIBIT TO THE GROUND DRIVER. MANUAL INHIBIT
AND GPC OPEN INHIBIT STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
THE ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-327
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-B, J2-R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH AND MDM FA4 "OPEN"
STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-328
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33 J2-C, J2-S
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC OPEN INHIBIT TO THE GROUND DRIVER. MANUAL INHIBIT AND
GPC CLOSE INHIBIT STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE
ISOLATION VALVE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33 J2-C, J2-S
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM SWITCH AND MDM FA4 "CLOSE"
STIMULI.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




MANIFOLD 5, OXIDIZER ISOLATION VALVE
51V42LV258 J15-1 (BOTH DIODES), 52V42LV358 J15-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE DIODE HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SECOND DIODE (THE
REDUNDANCY) PREVENTS FURTHER OXIDIZER VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE
IS CLOSED, VRCS IS NOT OPERABLE (LOSS OF MISSION). IF VALVE IS
OPEN, INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVES PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER
LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY,
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




MANIFOLD 5, OXIDIZER ISOLATION VALVE
51V42LV258 J15-1 (BOTH DIODES), 52V42LV358 J15-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM ERRONEOUS STIMULI TO THE
OXIDIZER SOLENOIDS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-332
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




MANIFOLD 5, FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
51V42LV257 J40-1 (BOTH DIODES); 5242LV357 J40-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE DIODE HAS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF SECOND DIODE, (THE
REDUNDANCY) PREVENTS FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS CLOSED,
VRCS IS NOT OPERABLE (LOSS OF MISSION). IF VALVE IS OPEN,
INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THRUSTER LEAK.
THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




MANIFOLD 5, FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
51V42LV257 J40-1 (BOTH DIODES); 5242LV357 J40-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES ISOLATION FROM ERRONEOUS STIMULI TO THE FUEL
SOLENOIDS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-334
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT GROUND DRIVER MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDS
STILL OPERABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS FURTHER VALVE
MOVEMENT. IF VALVE IS CLOSED, VRCS IS NOT OPERABLE (LOSS OF
MISSION). IF VALVE IS OPEN, INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. THIS, COUPLED WITH LOSS OF ALL
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-335
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN CIRCUIT BREAKER.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
SWITCH, SOLENOID TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VALVE
PART NUMBER: 51V42LV258, 257 J15-3, 9; 5242LV358, 357 J15-3, 9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR ISOLATION VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE STATUS.
MANIFOLD STATUS (MDM FAI, FA2) PROVIDES LATEST MICROSWITCH
DISCRETE INFORMATION OF THE VALVES LOCATION. VRCS MAY BE LOST IF
VALVES ARE THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION). ALSO LOSE
INHIBITS TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" AND "CLOSE" HYBRID DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-337
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH, SOLENOID TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
SWITCH, SOLENOID TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VALVE
51V42LV258, 257 J15-3, 9; 5242LV358, 357 J15-3, 9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE STATUS. VRCS MAY
BE LOST IF VALVES ARE THOUGHT TO BE CLOSED (LOSS OF MISSION).
ALSO LOSE INHIBITS TO THE TYPE III "OPEN" OR "CLOSE" HYBRID
DRIVERS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-338
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH I0, ii; 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THE HELIUM
SYSTEM LEADING TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF
PROPE_T TANKS AND LINES.
REFERENCES: ECN 102-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-339
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTAT SET (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH I0, ii; 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6 WILL
PREVENT FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS RCS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH I0, Ii; 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6 WILL
PREVENT ANY FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS RCS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY LEAD TO INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-341
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH i0, ii; 13, 14
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENTLY LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS,
COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, PREVENTS
ISOLATION OF THE HELIUM SYSTEM LEADING TO OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF PROPELLANT TANKS AND LINES.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B


















33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE CLOSED, POLE TO POLE SHORT WHICH SHORTS ACROSS
CONTACTS 5, 6 WILL PREVENT FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF
HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS RCS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 16, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVE WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE GPC. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS OPENING/CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE TO OPEN
THE ISOLATION VALVE AND THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY PREVENTS AFT RCS
ACTIVITY WHICH MAY LEAD TO EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS. FAILURE TO CLOSE THE VALVE
PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-344
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 16, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE
OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-345
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 16, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73ATSI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE
OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 16, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-347
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 16, 19
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7SI6; S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A SHORT TO CASE, CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SWITCH THE VALVES IS
LOST (BLOWN FUSE). REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH GPC COMMANDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DC, CC
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-348
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J2-73, J2-39, J2-63, J2-49; J5-25, J5-9,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J2-73, J2-39, J2-63, J2-49; J5-25, J5-9,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-350
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J2-74, J2-50; J5-26, J5-8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J2-74, J2-50; J5-26, J5-8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-352
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AI16 J3-i08, J2-16, J3-I07; J3-38, J5-121, J3-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-i08, J2-16, J3-i07; J3-38, J5-121, J3-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-101, J2-26, J3-100; J3-128, J5-i19,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I

















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-101, J2-26, J3-100; J3-128, J5-i19,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-356
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-60, J3-110; J5-49, J3-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET TANK LANDING CONTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-357
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-60, J3-110; J5-49, J3-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES












C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-48, J3-111; J5-19, J3-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-359
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-48, J3-111; J5-19, J3-1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-360
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES













LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 J2-60, J3-110; J5-49, J3-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-361
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J2-60, J3-110; J5-49, J3-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE (OPEN RELAY HAS CONSTANT
INHIBIT). THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-362
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES















AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-111, J2-48; J3-1, J5-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO OPEN THE RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-363
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIOE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 J3-111, J2-48; J3-1, J5-19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-364
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH 17, 18; 20, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CONTROL THE VALVE WITH THE SWITCH.
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE GPCo LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS OPENING/CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE. FAILURE TO RE-OPEN
THE ISOLATION VALVE AND THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY PREVENTS AFT RCS
ACTIVITY WHICH MAY LEAD TO EXCEEDNCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE TO CLOSE THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS WORST (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH 17, 18; 20, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SIT, S18; 33V73A7S20; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-366
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH 17, 18; 20, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH 17, 18; 20, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SIT, S18; 33V73A7S20; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION
THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE
INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-368
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
SHORT TO CASE OF POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH 17, 18; 20, 21
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17, S18; PNL 07 $20, $21
33V73A7SI7, S18; 33V73A7S20; $21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A SHORT TO CASE, CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SWITCH THE VALVE IS
LOST (BLOWN FUSE). REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH GPC COMMANDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS CLOSING THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A
THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DB, CB
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-369
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B



















J2-48, J2-69 - J2-87, J2-74; J2-36, J2-17 - Ji-50,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-370
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





J2-48, J2-69 - J2-87, J2-74; J2-36, J2-17 - JI-50,




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




33V73A7A2CR28, AICR35; J2-34, Jl-17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKABACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




33V73A7A2CR28, AICR35; J2-34, Jl-17




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA 1
PART NUMBER: J2-89, J2-87 - J2-78, J2-77; J2-56, J2-16 - Ji-39,
JI-37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





J2-89, J2-87 - J2-78, J2-77; J2-56, J2-16 - JI-39,




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





J2-90, J2-88 - J2-80, J2-79; J2-67, J2-25 - Ji-41,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-376
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





J2-90, J2-88 - J2-80, J2-79; J2-67, J2-25 - JI-41,




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-377
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA 1
PART NUMBER: J2-23, J2-I06; J2-7, JI-30
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-378
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA 1
PART NUMBER: J2-23, J2-I06; J2-7, JI-30




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




J2-21, J2-96; J2-15, JI-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-380
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-21, J2-96; J2-15, JI-29




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA 1
PART NUMBER: J2-23, J2-I06; J2-7, JI-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-382
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-23, J2-I06; J2-7, Ji-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE (OPEN RELAY HAS CONSTANT
INHIBIT). THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-21, J2-i06; J2-15, Ji-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO OPEN THE RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-384
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-21, J2-i06; J2-15, Ji-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS OPENED WITH THE GPC, LOSE INHIBIT TO CLOSE THE
VALVE. OTHER LEG AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS AFT
RCS ACTIVITY WHICH MAY LEAD TO EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING CONSTRAINTS
AND/OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 DSI; DS4
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATA2CR5, A2CR6; 33V73A7A3CR5, A3CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED WITH THE GPCs. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY
MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED WHICH COULD PREVENT
SOME MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-386
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CR5, A2CR6; 33V73A7A3CR5, A3CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2 SWITCH 32, 34
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUAL SWITCH THE VALVES OPEN OR CLOSE.
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN OR CLOSE THE VALVE IS PROVIDED WITH THE GPCs.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-388
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUAL SWITCH THE VALVES OPEN OR CLOSE ONCE IT
SHORTS. NO REDUNDANCY IS AVAILABLE. INABILITY TO SWITCH THE
VALVE CLOSED MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO SWITCH
VALVE OPEN DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-389
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73ATS32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT ACROSS EITHER CLOSE CONTACT SET (ii, 12 OR 5, 6) WILL
PREVENT THE VALVE FROM BEING OPENED. INABILITY TO OPEN THE
CROSSFEED VALVE MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD











L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY FAILS OPEN/SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7S32; $34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE IS CLOSED TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK, INADVERTENTLY
OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-391
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S32; $34
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE THUS PREVENTING MANUAL
SWITCHING OF VALVES. GPC COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-392
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J2-86, J2-66, J2-53, J2-76; J5-42, J5-
79, J5-89, J5-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN OFF MOTOR WHEN MOTOR WAS TURNED ON
MANUALLY TO OPEN THE VALVE. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER. MOTOR TURNS OFF WHEN VALVE IS COMMANDED CLOSED. THUS, NO
EFFECT TO OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J2-86, J2-66, J2-53, J2-76; J5-42, J5-
79, J5-89, J5-76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-394
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES












B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J2-87, J2-77; J5-43, J5-77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO UNLATCH THE RELAY WHEN MOTOR WAS TURNED ON
MANUALLY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY TO TURN MOTOR OFF IS
PROVIDED WITH ANOTHER DIODE TO UNLATCH THE RELAY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN
WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER. THUS, NO EFFECT TO OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J2-87, J2-77 ; J5-43, J5-77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS ONE CONTACT SET ON THE SWITCH TO DISCONTINUE POWER TO BOTH
"CLOSE" RELAYS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-396
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN









3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-i17, J2-30, J3-i16; J3-52, J5-40,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVES WITH THE GPC. MANUAL SWITCH
COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-397
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-i17, J2-30, J3-i16; J3-52, J5-40,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-398
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2

















AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-i13, J2-44, J3-i19; J3-62, J5-32,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL SWITCH
COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE
VALVE EFFECTS MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE
DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO COMPLETE AN OMS ABORT
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-399
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-i13, J2-44, J3-i19; J3-62, J5-32,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-400
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-3, J3-43; J3-66, J3-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING TO
OPEN THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN
THE VALVE MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-401
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J3-3, J3-43; J3-66, J3-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-402
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX& FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT












LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J3-4, J2-29; J3-67, J5-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING TO
CLOSE THE VALE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J3-4, J2-29; J3-67, J5-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-404
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-3, J2-43; J3-66, J5-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBIT TO ENSURE "CLOSE" RELAYS UNLATCH WHILE ATTEMPTING TO
OPEN THE VALVE MANUALLY. NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA:







REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J3-3, J2-43; J3-66, J5-30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE IS ATTEMPTED TO BE CLOSED USING THE GPC, THE VALVE
WILL CLOSE TEMPORARILY. HOWEVER, WITH THE SHORTED DIODE, "OPEN"
RELAYS ARE ENABLED TO CONDUCT THUS OPENING THE VALVES. SWITCH
OPERATION PREVENTS THIS FROM OCCURRING. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES















AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76AII6 - J3-4, J2-20; J3-67, J5-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBIT TO ENSURE "OPEN" RELAYS UNLATCH WHILE ATTEMPTING TO
CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6 - J3-4, J2-20; J3-67, J5-29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ONE OF TWO CLOSED RELAYS IN SERIES INHIBITED IS WORST
EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-408
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SWITCH THE VALVE OPEN OR CLOSE.
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN OR CLOSE THE VALVE IS PROVIDED WITH THE GPC.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-409
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 S35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY SWITCH THE VALVE ONCE IT SHORTS. NO
REDUNDANCY IS AVAILABLE. INABILITY TO SWITCH THE VALVE CLOSED
MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO SWITCH VALVE OPEN
DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENTS PROPELLANT TO BE EXPELLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD

















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
SWITCH ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT ACROSS EITHER CLOSE CONTACT SET (ii, 12 OR 5, 6) WILL
PREVENT THE VALVE FROM BEING OPENED. INABILITY TO OPEN THE
CROSSFEED VALVE MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY FAILS OPEN/CLOSED
SUBSYS LEAD: C.D. PRUSTLEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
B [NA ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE IS CLOSED TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK, INADVERTENTLY
OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-412
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
33V73A7S33; $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE THUS PREVENTING MANUAL
SWITCHING OF VALVES. GPC COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DD, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
54V76AII4 - J3-46, J3-8, J3-35, J4-7; J2-64, J2-80,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN MOTOR OFF WHEN MOTOR WAS TURNED ON
MANUALLY TO OPEN THE VALVE. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS
POWER. MOTOR TURNS OFF WHEN VALVE IS COMMANDED CLOSED. THUS, NO
EFFECT TO OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-414
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: " 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
54V76AII4 - J3-46, J3-8, J3-35, J4-7; J2-64, J2-80,
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-415
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J3-86, J4-9; J2-65, J2-63
VIBRA_S: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO UNLATCH THE RELAY WHEN MOTOR WAS TURNED ON
MANUALLY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY TO TURN MOTOR OFF IS
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO TURN MOTOR
OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND CONTINUOUS POWER. THUS, NO EFFECT
TO OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES















AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
54V76AII4 - J3-86, J4-9; J2-65, J2-63
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS ONE CONTACT SET ON THE SWITCH TO DISCONTINUE POWER TO BOTH
"CLOSE" RELAYS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 -J6-5, JI-56, J6-7; J3-80, J2-84, J3-81
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVES WITH THE GPC. MANUAL SWITCH
COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-418
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
54V76AII4 - J6-5, JI-56, J6-7; J3-80, J2-84, J3-81
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: _$70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-419
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-8, Ji-7, J6-49; J3-82, J2-83, J3-83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH THE GPC. MANUAL SWITCH
COMMANDING STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE
VALVE EFFECTS MISSION OBJECTIVES. INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE
WITH THE GPC DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INABILITY
TO COMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-420
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-8, Ji-7, J6-49; J3-82, J2-83, J3-83
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I

















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-48; J6-57; J3-91, J2-46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING TO
OPEN THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN
THE VALVE MAY EFFECT MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-422
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-48; J6-57; J3-91, J2-46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-6, J3-16; J3-90, J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING TO
CLOSE THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-424
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI4 - J6-6, J3-16; J3-90, J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA I; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 -J6-48, J6-57; J3-91, J2-46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBIT TO ENSURE "CLOSE" RELAYS UNLATCH WHILE ATTEMPTING TO
OPEN THE VALVE MANUALLY. NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-426
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-48, J6-57; J3-91, J2-46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE IS ATTEMPTED TO BE CLOSED USING THE GPC, THE VALVE
WILL CLOSE TEMPORARILY. HOWEVER, WITH THE SHORTED DIODE, OPEN
RELAYS ARE ENABLED TO CONDUCT THUS OPENING THE VALVES. SWITCH
OPERATIONS PREVENTS THIS FROM OCCURRING. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-427
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4 - J6-6, J3-16; J3-90, J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE INHIBIT TO ENSURE "OPEN" RELAYS UNLATCH WHILE ATTEMPTING TO
CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. NO EFFECT ON OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-428
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
54V76AII4 - J6-6, J3-16; J3-90, J2-68
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ONE OF TWO CLOSE RELAYS IN SERIES INHIBITED IS WORST
EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-429
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO FEED FROM LEFT OR RIGHT WITH GPC COMMANDS.
MANUAL CONFIGURATION OF VALVES PROVIDES REDUNDANCY (AND OVERRIDES
GPC COMMANDS). LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR C.G. SAFETY
BOUNDARIES FOR RTLS/TAL ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-430
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES CROSSFEEDING OPERATION FRO ONLY THE LEFT OR ONLY
THE RIGHT. MANUAL CONFIGURATION OF VALVES PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
(AND OVERRIDES GPC COMMANDS). LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO CROSSFEED AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
AND/OR C.G. SAFETY BOUNDARIES FOR RTLS/TAL ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC




MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $36
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S36
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS "OFF" CONTACTS (CONTACTS NOT IN A
CIRCUIT) LOSE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CROSSFEEDING OPERATIONS WITH
THE GPC. THIS IS THE WORST CASE SINCE IT CAUSES INCREASED NUMBER
OF MANUAL SWITCH MOVEMENTS TO CONFIGURE THE VALVES FOR
CROSSFEEDING. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
C.G. SAFETY BOUNDARIES FOR RTLS/TAL ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-432
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. SWITCH EASILY RETURNED TO PREVIOUS POSITION TO OFFSET
THE PROBLEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-433
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
SWITCH SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE MAY BLOW ONE, TWO OR ALL THESE 1 AMP FUSES
SUPPORTING THE CIRCUIT. WORST CASE (2 OR MORE BLOWN), LOSE
CAPABILITY TO AUTO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. MANUAL SWITCH
CONFIGURATION PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO CROSSFEED AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WIEGHT CONSTRAINTS OR
C.G. SAFETY MARGINS FOR RTLS/TAL ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CD
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22, $27
33V73A7S22, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDS
PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY TO
CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH WARRANT
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12173 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22, $27
33V73A7S22, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN
THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE RELEASED. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-436
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12174 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22, $27
33V73A7S22, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH
FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE EXPELLED. THIS MAY RESULT MAY RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $22, $27
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S22, $27
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE WAS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS
THRUSTER LEAK CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-438
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12176 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 22, 27
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22, $27
33V73A7S22, $27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS
FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT THUS POSSIBLE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12177 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23, $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S23, $28
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILILTY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC
COMMANDS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY
TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH
WARRANT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-440
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 12178 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23, $28
33V73A7S23, $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN
THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE RELEASED. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-441
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23, $28
33V73A7S23, $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH
FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE EXPELLED. THIS MAY RESULT MAY RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $23, $28
33V73A7S23, $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE WAS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS
THRUSTER LEAK CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12181 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 23, 28
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23, $28
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S23, $28
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS
FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT THUS POSSIBLE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-444
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12182 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24, $29
33V73A7S24, $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILILTY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC
COMMANDS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY
TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH
WARRANT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-445
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR &IST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : 3/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24, $29
33V73A7S24, $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN
THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE RELEASED. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE

















MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24, $29
33V73A7S24, $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH
FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE EXPELLED. THIS MAY RESULT MAY RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-447
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24, $29
33V73A7S24, $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE WAS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS
THRUSTER LEAK CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-448
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12186 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 24, 29
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24, $29
33V73A7S24, $29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS
FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT THUS POSSIBLE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-449
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25, $30
33V73A7S25, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILILTY TO MANUALLY OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. GPC
COMMANDS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN (CLOSE) THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. INABILITY
TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK. BOTH
WARRANT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-450
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25, S30
33V73A7S25, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS, CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN
THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE RELEASED. THIS MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $25, $30
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7S25, $30
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 (CLOSE), CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE VALVE IS LOST. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH
FIRE IN THE SAME DIRECTION ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS
SINCE PROPELLANT CANNOT BE EXPELLED. THIS MAY RESULT MAY RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-452
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12190 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25, $30
33V73A7S25, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE WAS CLOSED IN ORDER TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
INADVERTENTLY OPENING THE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF THIS
THRUSTER LEAK CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-453
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 12191 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCHES 25, 30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25, $30
33V73ATS25, $30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW CAUSING THE
INABILITY TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VALVE MANUALLY. GPC COMMANDING OF
THE VALVE STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY PREVENTS
FURTHER VALVE MOVEMENT THUS POSSIBLE EXCEEDANCE OF LANDING WEIGHT
WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-454
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




JI-57, 67; JI-54, 63
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-455
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-57, 67; Ji-54, 63
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL CLOSE AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
IIIRE_ERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
SPACE SHUTTLE
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-456
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: JI-56, 66; Ji-53, 64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




JI-56, 66; Ji-53, 64
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL OPEN AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-458
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: J3-33, Ji-33; J3-87, Ji-87
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING AND
SECOND GPC COMMAND STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY ISOLATE A LEAK, WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: J3-33, Ji-33; J3-87, Ji-87
] c [ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-460
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-23; Ji-20
] B [ ] C [ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: JI-43; JI-86
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-464
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-43; JI-86
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-466
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-34 ; JI-85
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-467
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-43; Ji-86
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: JI-43; JI-86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-469
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: JI-34; JI-85
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE OPEN RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-470
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #2
PART NUMBER: Ji-34; JI-85
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS OPENED WITH THE GPC, LOSE CAPABILITY TO RE-OPEN
THE VALVE. MANUAL SWITCH REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-471
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN








3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #I
PART NUMBER: J2-40, 28; J2-42, 31
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS&alI52HHANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-472
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-40, 28; J2-42, 31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL CLOSE AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-473
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-41, 29; J2-43, 32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPENAND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-474
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #I
PART NUMBER: J2-41, 29; J2-43, 32
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL OPEN AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-475
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J3-17, J2-55; J2-99, J3-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING AND
SECOND GPC COMMAND STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY ISOLATE A LEAK, WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J3-17, J2-55; J2-99, J3-2
] c [ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-5, J2-58
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-478
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #I
PART NUMBER: J2-5; J2-58
] B [ ] C [ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-12 ; J2-57
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-480
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-11; J2-47
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-482
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS



















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-484
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-12; J2-57
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE A LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-11; J2-47
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE OPEN RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-486
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #i
PART NUMBER: J2-11; J2-47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS OPENED WITH THE GPC, LOSE CAPABILITY TO RE-OPEN
THE VALVE. MANUAL SWITCH PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-487
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-79, 89; CR38
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-488
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-79, 89; CR38
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL CLOSE AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-80, 90; CR31
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-490
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL OPEN AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-491
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-20, J2-71; CR37, CR36
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING AND
SECOND GPC COMMAND STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY ISOLATE A LEAK, WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-492
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




J2-20, J2-71; CR37, CR36




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-493
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-494
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
OHORBIT: 3/2R A_n: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-57; CR28
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-496
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN




3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-497
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA # 3
PART NUMBER: J2-22 ; CR41
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK

















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION : AFT MCA # 3
PART NUMBER: J2-57 ; CR27
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-499
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-57 ; CR27
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE A LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-500
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE OPEN RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
































PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J2-22 ; CR42
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS OPENED WITH THE GPC, LOSE CAPABILITY TO RE-OPEN
THE VALVE. MANUAL SWITCH PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-84, 68; CR25
B C ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE LOGIC TALKBACK TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-503
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-84, 68; CR25
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL CLOSE AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-504
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-85, 60; CR95
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK LOGIC TO TURN MOTOR OFF. MOTOR CAN WITHSTAND
CONTINUOUS POWER. VALVE MOVEMENT OPEN AND CLOSE STILL OPERABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-85, 60; C495
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE ISOLATION BETWEEN MANUAL OPEN AND SWITCH
TALKBACK DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-506
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC CLOSE
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: Jl-l13, J3-64; CR34, CR35
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING AND
SECOND GPC COMMAND STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK, WHICH MAY LEAD TO
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




Jl-l13, J3-64; CR34, CR35




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-508
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. MANUAL COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-509
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - GPC OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - GPC OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: Ji-56; CR96
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-510
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS OPEN












PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-57; C4110
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO OPEN THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-511
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-57; C4110
] S[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-512
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS OPEN










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-68; CR30
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE MANUAL COMMAND TO CLOSE THE VALVE. GPC COMMANDING STILL
AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-513
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-514
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE CLOSE RELAYS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-515
PINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
FAILS SHORT













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-57 ; CRI09
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE A LEAK WHICH MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-516
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILS OPEN













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE "POWER OFF" INHIBIT TO THE OPEN RELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:




ITEM: DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT MCA #3
PART NUMBER: J3-68; CR30
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE WAS OPENED WITH THE GPC, LOSE CAPABILITY TO RE-OPEN
THE VALVE. MANUAL SWITCH PROVIDES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR C.G. SAFETY MARGINS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-518
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRONIC AND BITE POWER AND CAUSES INABILITY TO INHIBIT
DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD I AND LEFTVERNIER. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS AND LEFT VERNIER JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
JETS ON MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4. NO VERNIER REDUNDANCY EXISTS.
THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-519
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)












RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDAIB LI/LS/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIB L1/LS/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDAIB L1/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING RE-ENTRY, LOSE MANIFOLD 1 JET IF SWITCH INADVERTENTLY
SWITCHED OFF. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-522
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB L1/L5/R1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORS TO CASE THE ASSOCIATED 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW.
LOSS OF CURRENT ACROSS CONTACT SET 5, 6 IS WORST CASE. THIS
CAUSES LOSS OF ONE ELECTRICAL PATH TO TURN ON ELECTRONIC, BITE,
AND DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD 1 JETS AND CAUSES LOSS OF LEFT
VERNIERS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR LEFT VERNIER. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-523
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)


















RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 015 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON MANIFOLD 1 DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES
LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF
JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY. DURING RTLS/TAL,
JETS ARE REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-524
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIB L1/R1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/33
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-525
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDAIB L1/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-526
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING RE-ENTRY, MANIFOLD 1 JETS ARE USED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE. DURING RTLS/TAL, JETS
ARE REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELI2LNTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-527
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDAIB LI/RI MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE ASSOCIATED FUSE (I AMP OR 2 AMP)
WILL BLOW. THEREFORE, LOSE ONE PATH FOR DRIVER POWER REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET ON SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY CAUSE LOSS OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS. JET REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLDS 2, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL OF VEHICLE DURING RE-ENTRY. DURING
RTLS/TAL, JETS ARE REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2

















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRONIC AND BITE POWER AND CAUSES INABILITY TO INHIBIT
DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES A LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS i, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND
RE-ENTRY CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-529
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-530
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-531
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)












RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 014 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED OFF DURING ASCENT, LOSE
CAPABILITY TO FIRE MANIFOLD 2 JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON MANIFOLD 3 AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-532
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, IT WILL BLOW THE ASSOCIATED 1 AMP FUSE.
THEREFORE, LOSE 1 PATH FOR ELECTRONIC, BITE AND/OR DRIVER POWER.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET ON SWITCH. LOSS OF
THIS REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 2 JETS. JET
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLD i, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-533
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF
JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS I,
3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY
PREVENT ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-534
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 12273 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 014 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S4
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-536
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ASCENT, LOSE CAPABILITY TO FIRE MANIFOLD 2 JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 AND 4. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDACY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY PREVENT ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDAIA L2/R2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, IT WILL BLOW THE ASSOCIATED FUSE (i AMP
OR 2 AMP). THEREFORE, LOSS 1 PATH FOR DRIVER POWER. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET ON SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 2 JETS. JET REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLDS i, 3, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY PREVENT ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-538
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRONIC AND BITE POWER AND CAUSES INABILITY TO INHIBIT
DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD 3 AND RIGHT VERNIER. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF MANIFOLD 1 JETS AND RIGHT VERNIER JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4. NO REDUNDANCY FOR VERNIER
JETS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 $3
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
I, 2, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-542
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE ASSOCIATED 1 AMP FUSE WILL BLOW.
THIS CAUSES LOSS OF ONE ELECTRICAL PATH TO TURN ON ELECTRONIC,
BITE, AND DRIVER POWER FOR MANIFOLD 3 JETS AND CAUSES LOSS OF
RIGHT VERNIERS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS i, 2,
AND 4. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDE FOR VERNIER JETS. THIS MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON MANIFOLD 3 DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES
LOSS OF JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF
JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY. DURING RTLS/TAL,
JETS ARE REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii. I0, RCS SIG 2

















RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)












RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-546
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD . REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS
i, 2, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY. DURING RTLS/TAL, JETS ARE
REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT : 3/IR




RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST










4) MANIFOLD L3/R3, RJDA2B
RJDA2B L3/R3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 016 $4
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S4
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, THE ASSOCIATED FUSE (i AMP OR 2 AMP)
WILL BLOW. THEREFORE, LOSE ONE PATH FOR DRIVER POWER.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET ON SWITCH. LOSS OF
THIS REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 JETS. JET REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 4. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQURIED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY
DURING RTLS/TAL, JETS ARE REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG 11.10, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-548
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ELECTRONIC AND BITE POWER AND CAUSES INABILITY TO INHIBIT
DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 JETS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS i, 2, AND 3. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND
RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-549
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 10/01/87








ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-550
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)












RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 014 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S5
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ASCENT, LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. MANIFOLD 2 JETS PROVIDED
REDUNDANCY FOR -Z THRUST REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-552
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, IT WILL BLOW THE ASSOCIATED 1 AMP FUSE.
THIS CAUSES LOSS OF ONE ELECTRICAL PATH FOR ELECTRONIC, BITE
AND/OR DRIVER POWER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET
ON SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD
4 JETS. JET REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLDS 1, 2, AND 3.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET
SEPARATION ANDRE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-553
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON DRIVER POWER. THIS CAUSE LOSS OF JETS
ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLDS i, 2,
AND 3. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR
ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL MAY
PREVENT ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-554
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-555
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH FAILS SORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 014 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S6
] S[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-556
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING ASCENT, LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4, JETS ON MANIFOLD 2
PROVICE -Z THRUST REDUNDANCY REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION. FAILURE
DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENS ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-557
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
SWITCH FAILS SHORT TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST















RJDA2A L4/R4 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE, IT WILL BLOW THE ASSOCIATED FUSE (i AMP
OR 2 AMPS). THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ONE ELECTRICAL PATH FOR
DRIVER POWER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH OTHER CONTACT SET ON
SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 JETS.
JET REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH MANIFOLDS I, 2, AND 3. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-
ENTRY. FAILURE DURING RTLS/TAL PREVENTS ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-558
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS ON THE MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING
THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 $9
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4S9
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-560
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 12298 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-562
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
:a0576HSUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 12300 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 1 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OFJETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-563
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 2 MAY FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-564
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG Ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-565
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 2 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-566
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-567
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH i0
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)














MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 2 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)








3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH II
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2

















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii
SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC ii174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-570
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii. I0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-571
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)










3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 SII
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SII
] B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-572
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH Ii
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CAES)















MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 3 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI2
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REAMINING THREE MANIFOLDS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-574
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-575
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWICH 12
SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 4 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT ON-ORBIT OPERAITONS THUS MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-576
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 12
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S12
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI2
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 4
HAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JET. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
REMAINING THREE MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY PREVENT
ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS THUS MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-578
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN JETS ON MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF
JETS. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY AFT VERNIERS. THIS MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-579
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13



















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THERMOSTAT) TO CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-580
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 12318 ABORT: 2/2
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS SHORT ACROSS CONTACT SET (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS IN MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. NO
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR AFT VERNIERS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-581
j'
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH INADVERTENTLY OPENS/CLOSES (WORST CASE)









3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S13
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI3
3 B[ ] C[ ]




REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC ii174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG II.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-582
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
SWITCH SHORTS TO CASE OR POLE TO POLE (WORST CASE)















MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SHORT TO CASE WILL BLOW 1 AMP FUSE. PROPELLANS IN JETS ON
MANIFOLD 5 MAY FREEZE CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. NO REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED FOR AFT VERNIERS. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CP; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PG ii.i0, RCS SIG 2
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-583
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: LEFT OMS POD
PART NUMBER: 5 IV75A25
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL
CONDITIONER. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT JET. THEREFORE,
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT +Y OR -Z JET. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
JETS ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF JETS REQURIED FOR RE-ENTRY. DESELECTION OF JET DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS/RCS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-584
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO : 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL
CONDITIONER. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT JET. THEREFORE,
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT +Y OR -Z JET. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
JETS ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS
OF JETS REQUIRED FOR RE-ENTRY. DESELECTION OF JET DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO COMPLETE AN OMS/RCS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: RIGHT OMS POD
PART NUMBER: 52V75A24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL
CONDITIONER. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT JET. THEREFORE,
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT +Y OR -Z JET. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
JETS ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR RE-ENTRY. DESELECTION OF JET DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS/RCS ABORT DUMPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01


















INCORRECT OR LOSS OF OUTPUT (WORST CASE)
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSOR DATA IS ROUTED THROUGH SIGNAL
CONDITIONER. DATA RECEIVED AT GPC CAN DESELECT JET. THEREFORE,
INCORRECT DATA MAY DESELECT +Y OR -Z JET. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
JET ON DIFFERENT MANIFOLD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED FOR RE-ENTRY. DESELECTION OF JET DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS/RCS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-587
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS OFF




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDA #I OR RJDA #2
PART NUMBER: 54V79AI0 AND 56V79AII
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JET ASSOCIATED WITH +Y, -Y, OR -Z THRUST COMPONENT IS THE
WORST CASE. REDUNDANCY FOR JET PROVIDED BY JET ON DIFFERENT
MANIFOLD. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED
FOR ET SEPARATION AND TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF THRUSTER DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT
CAUSES INABILITY TO COMPLETE A OMS DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-588
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS ON




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDA #i OR RJDA #2
PART NUMBER: 54V79AI0 AND 56V79AII
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JET DRIVER FAILED ON WILL PROVIDE LATCHING ENERGY TO BI-
PROPELLANT VALVES ALLOWING FIRING. CREW MUST ISOLATE PROPELLANT
BY CLOSING ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. INADVERTENT FIRING DURING ANY
MISSION PHASE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













JET DRIVER FAILS OFF




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDA #i OR RJDA #2
PART NUMBER: 54V79AI0 AND 56V79AII
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE JET ASSOCIATED WITH +Y AND -Y VERNIER THRUST COMPONENT. NO
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. THIS MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
DUE TO LOSS OF VERNIERS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-590
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV238, 51V42LV237, 52V42LV338, 52V42LV337
JI-F (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-591
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)
FAILURE MODE: JET DRIVER FAILS ON

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: WITHIN RJDA #I OR RJDA #2
PART NUMBER: 54V79AI0 AND 56V79AII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JET DRIVER FAILED ON WILL PROVIDE LATCHING ENERGY TO BI-
PROPELLANT VALVES ALLOWING FIRING. CREW MUST ISOLATE PROPELLANT
BY CLOSING MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE. INADVERTENT FIRING DURING
ANY MISSION PHASE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-592
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV201, 51V42LV202, 51V42LV203, 51V42LV204
Jl-i (8 DIODES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DIODE REQUIRED TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF THIS MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV201, 51V42LV202, 51V42LV203, 51V42LV204
Jl-i (8 DIODES)




REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01


















ERONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV201, 51V42LV202, 51V42LV203, 51V42LV204
Ji-6 (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01













FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 51V42LV227, 51V42LV228, 51V42LV217, 51V42LV218
PART NUMBER: JI-F (FOUR MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW THE VALVE
TO BE CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPRATION THUS LOSS OF
MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE
OMS ABORT DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1


















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R OX & FU ISOL TK 3/4/5 A & B
MI CROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV265, 51V42LV266, 51V42LV263, 51V42LV264
JI-F (EIGHT MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILED ACROSS THE OPEN CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE FROM
BEING OPENED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY SECOND LEG OF
3/4/5 AND 1/2 VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR RE-ENTRY CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-597
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV371, 51V42LV372, 51V42LV271, 51V42LV272
JI-F (4 MICROSWITCHES), JI-K (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILED ACROSS CLOSED CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE FROM
BEING CLOSED. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-598
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 51V42LV373, 51V42LV374, 51V42LV273, 51V42LV274
PART NUMBER: JI-F (4 MICROSWITCHES), JI-K (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MICROSWITCH FAILED ACROSS CLOSED CONTACTS PREVENTS VALVE FROM
BEING CLOSED TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-599
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)










3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 52V42LV317, 52V42LV318
PART NUMBER: JI-F (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-600
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS.
MICROSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-601
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (WORST CASE)













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
51V42LV248, 51V42LV247, 52V42LV348, 52V42LV347
J1-F (4 MICROSWITCHES)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED MICROSWITCH PREVENTS ACCURATE VALVE POSITION DATA.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF TALKBACK MAY LEAD TO
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED THUS LIMITING ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01


















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR5; A3CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ELECTRICAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CR6; A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ELECTRICAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-604
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
54V76AI33A2CRI6; 54V76AI32A3CR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ELECTRICAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33A2CRIS; 55V76AI32A3CR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. ELECTRICAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-606
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND













PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEMS
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33AJ8-Z, J8-M
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. INABILITY TO OPEN
ISOLATION VALVE PREVENTS VRCS OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: ECN I02-8023A
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-607
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 1 DIRVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-608
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI31A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 1 DIRVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-609
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR7
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 1 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK


















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32A2CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 1 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-611
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 2 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-612
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 2 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-613
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 2 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-614
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 2 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-615
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, PCA 2
55V76AI32A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-616
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK


















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-618
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 3 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-619
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3 / IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 4 DRIER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-620
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3
56V76AI33A2CRI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 4 DRIVER POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3, PCA 3
56V76AI33A3CRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 4 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-622
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 3, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE CIRCUIT FOR MANIFOLD 4 LOGIC POWER. ELECTRICAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON
OTHER MANIFOLDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF JETS
REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION AND RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-623
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, PCA 1
54V76AI31A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE DRIVER POWER TO LEFT MANIFOLD 5 JETS.
JETS ON MANIFOLD 5 THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
THIS LOSS OF
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-624
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS SHORT TO GROUND

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:






LOSE DRIVER POWER TO RIGHT MANIFOLD 5 JETS.
JETS ON MANIFOLD 5 THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
THIS CAUSES LOSS OF
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE : 2/26/88 E-625

APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
the corresponding IOA assessment worksheets included in Appendix
C. The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, IOA
recommended criticalities and redundancy screens, and issue
codes.
HARDWARE ISSUE CODES
HDW 1 IOA recommends that this failure mode be upgraded
to a CIL item.
HDW 2 IOA recommends a criticality and/or screen upgrade.
HDW 3 IOA recommends a criticality and/or screen
downgrade.
HDW 4 IOA recommends that this failure mode be added to
the FMEA/CIL.
HDW 5 IOA recommends that this item be added to the
n A/CIL.
HDW 6 IOA recommends editorial revisions to this
FMEA/CIL.
HDW 7 IOA recommends a i/1 abort criticality for this
failure mode.








IOA recommends a 3/2R PPP for this failure mode
(loss of talkback data leading to falsely failing
a valve closed).
IOA recommends a downgrade for this FMEA/CIL based
on IOA interpretation of NSTS 22206.
IOA recommends an upgrade or an addition of other
failure scenarios that have IR or CIL criticalities.
This EPD&C issue is tied to a IOA hardware issue.
IOA recommends this item and failure be added to
the FMEA/CIL.




NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOHNENDATZONS - FORWARD HARDWARE
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HW/F J A B C
z_mlss_zuB_zmmmmml
3/1R P P P
3/1R P P P
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3/IR P P P
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J CR,T j SCREENS
J Hld/F I A s c
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zoA II CRIT I SCREENS









































































J CRIT I SCREENS
I NWf I A a c
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3/1R P F P
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1/1
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NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE I RECOMMENDATIONS - AFT HARDWARE
I IDENTIFIERS II NASA
I..........................................II..................
NASA IOA II CRIT I SCREENS
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F F P 2/1R
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F F P 2/1R
F F P 2/1R
F F P II 2/1R
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ARCS-1960 II 3/3 II
05-6KA-2259A-1 ARCS-1917 II 3/1R P F P JJ
ARCS-192S II 3/1R e e e II
ARCS-1929 II 3/1R P e P II
ARCS-1937 Jl 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1951 II 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1957 II 3/1R e e
ARCS-1963 II 3/_n P e e









05-6KA-2260-1 ARCS-IZ345X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12366X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12349X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12350X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12353X 3/IR P F P
ARCS-12354X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12356X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12357X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-12358X 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1909 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1911 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1931 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1941 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1943 3/1R P e P II
ARCS-1965 3/IR P F P II
ARCS-196§ 3/1R P F P
ARCS-1975 II 3/IR P F P








05-6KA-2261-1 ARCS-12130X 2/1R P F P 313 EPD&C 2 X
ARCS-12132X 2/1R P F P 313 EPD&C 2 X
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